Why night trains struggle to break even – even when passengers love them
INSIGHT: When SNCF and ÖBB announced the closure of Paris-Berlin and Paris-Wien Nightjet routes in late September, they revealed an uncomfortable truth: even with 70% occupancy and 66,000 annual passengers across both routes, the services required EUR 5-10 million in annual subsidies per route. France’s decision to withdraw that funding exposed the fundamental economic challenge facing night trains across Europe.
Europe dreams of night train renaissance. Over 50,000 people signed petitions protesting the closures. Environmental activists champion sleeper services as the climate-friendly alternative to budget airlines. Passengers share romantic stories of waking up in Vienna or Berlin after a comfortable journey through the Alps.
Yet the economics remain brutally difficult.
The one-trip problem
Night trains face a mathematical problem that day services and airlines don’t. A seat on a TGV can be sold four times daily. An airline seat can generate revenue five times per day. But a night train berth: Once.
While a seat on an aeroplane can be sold up to five times a day and a seat on a day train up to four times, a seat on a night train can only be sold once a day, SNCF Voyageurs stated when explaining the closure decision.
This single factor transforms the entire economic equation. To match the per-seat revenue of a day train, a night service would need to charge four times as much.
To compete with budget airlines on price while covering costs becomes nearly impossible through ticket sales alone.
Costs that multiply in the dark
The one-trip revenue problem collides with systematically higher operating costs. Night services require premium pay for staff working unsociable hours. Sleeper trains need attendants beyond what day services employ. Cross-border routes trigger additional personnel requirements at each frontier.
Infrastructure charges accumulate across multiple countries on a single journey. A Paris-Berlin service pays track access fees to France, Germany, and any transit nations. Energy costs rise with journey duration. Daily cleaning, fresh linens, and sleeper compartment maintenance add expenses that seated day trains avoid.
The rolling stock itself represents a major barrier. Specialist sleeper coaches cost more to procure and maintain than standard carriages. Supply remains limited. Even ÖBB, Europe’s largest night train operator with 1.5 million annual passengers, faces constraints sourcing the 24 new Nightjet trains it has ordered.
Against this cost structure, the Paris-Berlin and Paris-Wien routes achieved 70% occupancy in 2024. In most transport markets, that would signal success. For night trains, it still meant losses requiring millions in annual subsidies.
The cannibalization trap
European rail expert Jon Worth has identified a deeper problem: incumbent operators face perverse incentives. If SNCF launches a Paris-Barcelona night train, some passengers will choose it over profitable daytime TGV services.
Even if the night service breaks even, total company revenue may fall.
This explains the French paradox. President Macron championed night train revival. But SNCF never invested seriously. The Paris-Berlin route ran just three days weekly instead of the planned daily service. The company allocated just EUR 100 million annually for all French night trains – an amount SNCF leadership publicly called insufficient.
Advocacy group Oui au train de nuit (Yes to night trains) argues this represents managed decline: “International night trains in 2025 are in the same situation as domestic night trains in 2015: SNCF is degrading the service and thus encouraging the government to get rid of it.”
For incumbent operators, the rational choice is often to avoid night services entirely. The economics work against them even when passenger demand exists.
Barriers beyond the balance sheet
Structural factors compound these challenges. Different signaling systems, electrification standards, and track gauges create operational complexity at borders.
Night-time track capacity must compete with freight services and infrastructure maintenance windows.
Tax policy introduces hidden advantages for aviation. International flights carry no VAT. Aviation fuel remains untaxed. Activists estimate this creates a EUR 30-40 per ticket subsidy advantage for airlines.
EU regulations complicate cross-border rail financing. Booking systems remain fragmented – SNCF didn’t even sell Paris-Berlin tickets through its own SNCF Connect platform. These aren’t problems any single operator can solve.
The subsidy question
ÖBB proves night trains can work at scale – but not without public support. The Austrian operator runs Europe’s most extensive network and continues investing. Private operators like RDC Deutschland, which recently took over the Stockholm-Berlin route after SJ withdrew, and Sweden’s Snälltåget demonstrate alternatives exist.
But none operate without significant challenges. When Sweden ended subsidies, SJ immediately announced closure plans. RDC stepped in, but the route’s economics remain difficult.
The fundamental question isn’t whether demand exists. Petition signatures and 70% occupancy rates confirm people want these services. The question is whether European governments will commit the sustained subsidies required – or whether night trains remain a romantic dream that economics won’t allow.